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PLAYING THE ODDS: THE REALITIES OF
STATE-BY-STATE SUITABILITY
DETERMINATIONS AND THE NEED FOR
FEDERAL REGULATION
Daniel N. Clay

INTRODUCTION
With some exceptions, gaming in the United States is a growing industry.1
While commercial casino revenue peaked in 2007, which was followed by a
sharp decline at the height of the Great Recession, in 2012 national gaming
revenues reached the second highest level in history.2 Not only has the rebound
translated into increased revenues, employment rates, and economic
development — it has also led to sharp increases in gaming tax revenue for the
vast majority of states that permit commercial casinos — Kansas,3 Maryland,4
Maine,5 and New York6 are most notable.7 As discussed below, while gaming
heavily impacts interstate commerce, the industry is still governed by a
patchwork of differing state laws.8 This article seeks to show that these
inconsistencies in state law are especially prevalent in state-by-state suitability
determinations, in which states may disagree about the suitability for licensure
of a single casino applicant or otherwise make conflicting determinations of
similarly situated applicants.9 Moreover, this article argues that such
inconsistencies, coupled with the lack of meaningful judicial review, have
caused uncertainty for would-be applicants, and in turn necessitates meaningful
See Am. Gaming Ass’n, State of the States: The AGA Survey of Casino
Entertainment, at ii (2013), https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/
research_files/aga_sos2013_rev042014.pdf.
2
See id.
3
Id. at 6 (reporting a 604.7% increase in gaming tax revenue during FY 2012).
4
Id. (reporting a 143.7% increase in gaming tax revenue during FY 2012).
5
Id. (reporting a 48.3% increase in gaming tax revenue during FY 2012).
6
Id. (reporting a 38.6 % increase in gaming tax revenue during FY 2012).
7
See id.
8
See INT’L. BUS. PUB., US GAMBLING INDUSTRY LAW AND REGULATIONS
HANDBOOK 5-7 (2011).
9
See infra Part II-III.
1
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federal reform.10
I. INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF STATE POLICE POWERS
While Congress is vested with the ability to regulate interstate commerce
and may otherwise restrict “permissible state regulation,” such a limitation is
“‛by no means absolute,’ as the [s]tates retain their general police power to
regulate areas of ‘legitimate local concern’ even though such regulation may
affect interstate commerce.”11 Historically, state gaming regulations have fallen
within the broad scope of “police powers” because the subject matter
necessarily implicates “the state’s paramount interest in the health, welfare,
safety, and morals of its.citizens.”12 As such, courts have uniformly recognized

See infra Part IV-VI.
Gulch Gaming, Inc. v. South Dakota, 781 F. Supp. 621, 624 (D.S.D. 1991)
(emphasis added) (quoting Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35
(1980)). See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 331 (1979); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 128-129 (1978). The term “police power”
refers to a “state’s Tenth Amendment right, subject to [certain, well delineated
exceptions], to establish and enforce laws protecting the public’s health, safety, and
general welfare.” Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
12
Johnson v. Collins Entm’t Co., 199 F.3d 710, 720 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Chicago
& Alton R.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 77 (1915) (noting that “[t]he
regulation of lotteries, betting, poker, and other games of chance touch all . . .
aspects of the quality of life of state citizens”). See Commonwealth v. Wolbarst, 65
N.E.2d 552, 553 (Mass. 1946). As noted in Wolbarst, the ability of states to
regulate gaming stems from colonial statutes, dating back over three hundred years,
for instance:
10
11

Colonial Laws, 57, § 2, prohibited one from bowling, using a shuffleboard
or playing any game in a house of common entertainment. Penalties were
imposed upon the one in charge of the house and also upon the player. All
persons were prohibited from playing with cards or dice or any ‘game for
any money or money worth.’ The preamble of St. 1719-20, c. 8,
condemning lotteries as common and public nuisances and imposing heavy
penalties for setting up and promoting them, declared that the existence of
lotteries tends to the impoverishment of the people, constitutes a reproach
to the government, and is ‘against the common good, trade, welfare and
peace of the province.’ Statute, 1732-33, c. 14, §§ 2, 3, further prohibited
the setting up of lotteries. Gambling was prohibited further by St. 1785-86,
c. 58, which provided that notes, bonds and mortgages given in payment of
gambling debts should be void; losers were given a remedy to recover their
losses; winners of sums exceeding twenty shillings were subject to a
forfeiture of double the amount won and were barred from holding public
office for a certain period; and persons were prohibited from playing with
cards or dice or at billiards or with any other implement used in gaming in
any tavern or house of entertainment or from exposing to public view any
such articles in such places. The legislative policy of recognizing gambling
as a State wide problem and dealing with it on that basis appears from the
preamble of St. 1785-86, c. 58, which stated that ‘the practice of gaming
for money or other property is not only injurious in a high degree to the
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and upheld state regulation of “lotteries, betting, poker, and other games of
chance,” including the state’s ability to license casinos.13
Gaming licensing is not a unique practice.14 States regularly exercise their
“police powers” by imposing licensing requirements on various routine
activities and professions for the ultimate protection of the public.15 Just as
states require attorneys to be licensed in order to ensure they do not abuse their
position of trust to the detriment of clients, states license casinos to ensure the
integrity of gaming activity.16 In the context of gaming, not only do licensing
requirements ensure the protection of the public from “rigged” or otherwise
unfair gaming, but it also ensures public trust in the industry.17
While states are freely able to regulate gaming within their borders to
protect their citizenry and to benefit the industry as a whole, the localization of
regulation has led to a patchwork of contradictory licensing structures and
outcomes.18 In determining whether an applicant is suitable for a gaming

individuals concerned therein, but also in its tendency, ruinous and
destructive to the State.
Id. at 553-54.
13
Johnson, 199 F.3d at 720. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1879)
(“[c]ertainly the right to suppress [gaming activity] is governmental, to be
exercised at all times by those in power, at their discretion.”). Wolbarst, 65 N.E.2d
at 553 (“[t]he suppression of gambling lies within the domain of the police power
of the Commonwealth.”).
14
ANTHONY N. CABOT & KEITH C. MILLER, THE LAW OF GAMBLING AND
REGULATED GAMING 87 (2011).
15
See id.
16
Id. (noting that licensing “assur[es] that certain persons are not involved in [the]
casino industry . . . includ[ing] those who are so incompetent that they cannot
detect and prevent schemes by employees or patrons to cheat other patrons”). The
need for this licensing regime is clear, especially compared to the Italian model in
which Italy legalized gambling with little to no licensing requirement — the result
of which has been soaring mafia involvement and profit. See Steve Scherer, Mafia
Thrives on Italy’s Legalized Gambling Addiction, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2015, 4:50
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/11/us-italy-mafia-slots-idUSKBN0M
720R20150311.
17
See CABOT & MILLER, supra note 14, at 87.
18
As of 2012, only seventeen states permitted stand-alone commercial casinos,
each with distinct licensing requirements, including: Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and West Virginia. Types
of Gaming by State, AM. GAMING ASS’N, https://web.archive.org/web/201504231
65104/http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/
states-gaming (last visited Jan. 5, 2018). Conversely, twenty-eight states permit
Indian Casinos (Class II or Class III facilities), including: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Each of these states has
adopted unique licensing structures that, based upon a common model, may be in
irreconcilable conflict with one another. See id. For instance, both the
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license,19 licensing authorities are guided by their respective state statutes,
which require consideration of several fairly common factors and criteria (e.g.
financial stability; character, integrity, and responsibility; experience and
competence; etc.).20 However, as independent agencies, most licensing
authorities or gaming commissions are given very broad discretion in
determining the weight and impact of each of the statutory factors on the final
determination of suitability.21 Because of this very broad discretion, licensing
authorities may — and sometimes do — come to contradictory conclusions
about an applicant’s suitability.
A. The MGM Determination
In March 2010, MGM Resorts International (“MGM”) was forced to
surrender its New Jersey gaming license as part of a settlement with the New
Jersey Casino Control Commission (“New Jersey Commission”) after a 2009
Massachusetts Expanded Gaming Act and the Pennsylvania Race Horse
Development and Gaming Act were based upon the New Jersey Casino Control
Act, with some modifications. See generally Comprehensive Analysis: Projecting
and Preparing for Potential Impact of Expanded Gaming on Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Spectrum Gaming Group (2008), http://www.mass.gov/hed/docs/
eohed/ma-gaming-analysis-final.pdf (laying the predicate analysis to the
Massachusetts Expanded Gaming Act). Under this common model, Pennsylvania’s
Gaming Control Board consists of seven members — three members appointed by
the governor, and one member appointed by each legislative caucus leader (i.e. the
President pro tempore of the Senate; the Minority Leader of the Senate; the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives). 4 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1201(b) (West 2017).
Further, licensing decisions must be made by a qualified majority of the members,
consisting of at least one gubernatorial appointee and all four legislative
appointees. Id. at § 1201(f)(1). In contrast, the Massachusetts Gaming Commission
consists of only five members, all appointed by the executive branch — one
member appointed by the governor, one member appointed by the attorney general,
one member appointed by the treasurer, and two members appointed by a majority
vote of the governor, attorney general, and treasurer. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
23K, § 3(a) (West 2017). All licensing decisions are made by a simple majority
vote of three commissioners. Id. at § 3(d). Further, and more important to this
analysis, Massachusetts prohibits legislative appointment to executive
commissions, thus creating an irreconcilable conflict with Pennsylvania’s licensing
structure. See In re Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 341 N.E.2d 254, 258
(1976).
19
Depending on the states statutory provisions regarding the “depth” of the
suitability determination, this may include the prospective casino’s officers,
directors, major shareholders (5-15% ownership stakes), significant vendors
($250,000 / annually), key employees, etc. See CABOT & MILLER, supra note 14, at
109-10.
20
See id. at 120-37 (discussing the “criteria” component of suitability
determinations).
21
Exhibit 99.3 Gaming and Regulatory Overview, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/858339/000119312512115625/d268435de
x993.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
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inquiry recommended that MGM’s joint-venture partners were unsuitable, and
that MGM’s due diligence/compliance efforts with New Jersey’s Casino
Control Act were inadequate.22 Of particular interest to the New Jersey
Commission was MGM’s relationship with Pansy Ho Catilina Chiu King
(“Pansy Ho”) during a 2007 joint venture in which the parties built and
operated a casino in Macau, China.23 Specifically, the New Jersey Commission
was concerned with the “numerous public allegations suggesting that Stanley
Ho, the father of. . . Pansy Ho, ha[d] ties to Asian organized crime” and that
Pansy Ho was merely acting as a third-party standing-in for Stanley Ho.24
The investigation into the suitability of Pansy Ho largely confirmed the
public allegations.25 The investigation revealed that Pansy Ho “had no prior
gaming experience before the joint venture, bringing to the partnership [with
MGM] primarily opportunities and influence provided by her business and
personal relationship with her father,” and that ninety percent of the funds for
her stake in the joint venture were derived from her father.26 Additionally,
throughout the joint venture, Pansy Ho maintained positions of leadership and
governance in her father’s companies — some of which likely had ties to
organized crime.27 While the New Jersey Commission was unable to establish a
direct tie between Pansy Ho and the criminal activity of her father, the
commission still deemed Pansy Ho unsuitable, concluding that “Pansy Ho’s
See Paula T. Dow & Josh Lichtblau, N.J. Office of the Attorney Gen., Casino
Control Commission Approves Settlement Under Which MGM Mirage Will Divest
Interest in Borgata Hotel Casino, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (N.J.) (Mar. 17,
2010), http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases10/pr20100317c.html. See also STATE
OF N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE DIVISION OF
GAMING ENFORCEMENT TO THE CASINO CONTROL COMMISSION ON ITS
INVESTIGATION OF MGM MIRAGE’S JOINT VENTURE WITH PANSY HO IN MACAU,
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1-4 (2009),
http://www.state.nj.us/casinos/home/info/docs/MGM/dge_%20report_redacted.pdf
[hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT]. This follows a 2006 New Jersey Commission order,
in which one of MGM’s board members — Terry Christensen — was required to
resign following his indictment for wiretapping former MGM owner Kirk
Kerkorian’s ex-wife. See Matthew Sturdevant, MGM Settles Allegations in New
Jersey to Regain Gaming License, HARTFORD COURANT (Aug. 22, 2014, 5:14 PM),
http://www.courant.com/business/hc-mgm-new-jersey-20140822-story.html. While
these allegations were not germane to the 2009 New Jersey determination, they
were considered by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission in its subsequent
determination. Id.
23
See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 1. While the joint venture was created in
2007, as of the date of investigation, MGM and Pansy Ho still maintained a onehalf interest each in the casino. Id.
24
See id. at 2-3.
25
See id. at 4-5.
26
Id. at 4.
27
See id. Somewhat passively, the New Jersey Commission noted that prior to
partnering with Pansy Ho, MGM originally negotiated with Pansy Ho to enter into
the joint venture directly with Stanley Ho, before determining that Stanley Ho was
unsuitable. Id.
22
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susceptibility to her father’s influence and issues of personal suitability render
the joint venture and MGM vulnerable to improper associations and influences
and compromise MGM’s suitability as a New Jersey licensed entity.”28
Based on this adverse determination, the New Jersey Commission then
turned its focus to MGM’s suitability, and ultimately concluded that MGM
failed to abide its diligence and reporting requirements under the state’s Casino
Control Act.29 The commission specifically noted that “MGM failed to
examine the most critical aspects of Pansy Ho’s suitability, namely, her ability
to finance her contribution to the joint venture and her independence from her
father . . .”30 Despite the lack of a meaningful review of Pansy Ho’s suitability,
MGM did possess derogatory information regarding her suitability; however,
MGM failed to disclose this information to the New Jersey Commission or the
regulatory bodies of other states in which MGM was licensed.31 Based on these
conclusions, the New Jersey Commission determined that MGM failed to fulfill
its obligations under state law, and thus adverse action against the company
was warranted.32
The New Jersey Commission’s decision to take adverse action against
MGM was significant, especially in light of the fact that other states have since
considered MGM’s association with the Ho family, but none have made an
adverse determination regarding MGM’s suitability for a gaming license.33 In
fact, Nevada regulators “determined that Pansy Ho, under [Nevada] law, was
sufficiently independent . . . there were adequate protections in place, there
wouldn’t be any ability of a third party to exert any influence over the joint
venture, whether that be Stanley Ho or anyone else.”34 Therefore, despite the
Id.
See id. at 4-5. The New Jersey Commission noted deficiencies in MGM’s
regulatory compliance during the Macau operations, but also highlighted MGM’s
failures domestically. Id.
30
Id. at 5. The New Jersey Commission noted that this was not an instance where
MGM conducted due diligence and merely made a flawed conclusion, but rather
failed to do any meaningful diligence regarding Pansy Ho’s suitability. Id.
31
Id. at 4-5.
32
See id. at 5. Initially the New Jersey Commission ordered that MGM “disengage
itself from any direct or indirect business or financial associations with Pansy Ho.”
Id at 74. However, MGM negotiated a settlement in which it would surrender its
gaming license and divest its interest in the New Jersey Casino, without otherwise
impacting its Macau operations or disassociating with Pansy Ho. Id. See also Dow
& Lichtblau supra note 22.
33
MASS. GAMING COMM’N, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS
GAMING COMMISSION: BLUE TARP REDEVELOPMENT, LLC 116 (2013), http://mass
gaming.com/wp-content/uploads/MGM-Report-REDACTED.pdf (“The view of the
[New Jersey Commission] has not been followed in other jurisdictions. To the
contrary, no other U.S. gaming regulator in any jurisdiction where MGM conducts
gaming business has raised an objection to the MGM/Pansy Ho partnership.”).
34
Beth Jinks, MGM Partner Ho is ‘Unsuitable,’ Gaming Agency Says (Update2),
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18, 2010, 4:48 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20140428191
330/http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aqZga1sai1Lg.
28
29
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exact same suitability considerations and evidence, MGM was deemed suitable
in Nevada despite New Jersey’s contrary opinion.35
Similarly, Massachusetts seemed to give little-to-no weight to the findings
and decision of the New Jersey Commission, even though the New Jersey
Casino Control Act served as the model for the Massachusetts Expanded
Gaming Act.36 The Massachusetts Gaming Commission acknowledged that
“[t]here is no dispute about the fact that when MGM was negotiating the 2004
partnership deal with Pansy Ho, MGM did not conduct any investigation into
her source of funds . . . nor did MGM conduct any investigation into whether
she was acting independently from her father, whom MGM apparently agreed
would not have satisfied the suitability requirements for licensure . . .”37
However, the commission rejected the New Jersey Commission’s fear that
Pansy Ho, and thus MGM, was susceptible to her father’s influence.38 Instead,
the Massachusetts Commission noted that in June 2011, Pansy Ho’s status as
an equal joint-venture partner was reduced to twenty-nine percent, whereas
MGM’s interest increased to fifty-one percent.39 Further, Pansy Ho had “no
day-to-day operational duties and no involvement in gaming,” instead her
duties consisted of “real estate development, design, marketing, entertainment,
special events and ‘big picture stuff.’”40 As such, the internal structure of MGM
served as a check on her susceptibly to corrupt influences.41 These factors,
combined with Maryland’s favorable determination regarding MGM’s
suitability prior to the completion of the Massachusetts investigation, prompted
Massachusetts to deem MGM suitable for a gaming license in June 2014.42
In September 2014, shortly after the suitability determination by the
Massachusetts Gaming Commission, the New Jersey Commission again
granted MGM a gaming license, allowing the company to resume operations
and regain control of its fifty percent stake in an existing New Jersey casino.43
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting former chairman of the Nevada
Gaming Control Board, Dennis Neilander).
35
See id.
36
See MASS. GAMING COMM’N, supra note 33, at 116; see generally AM. GAMING
ASS’N supra note 18.
37
Id. at 115.
38
See id. at 115-17.
39
Id. at 52.
40
Id. at 117. The investigation did conclude that Pansy Ho executes all agreements
with gaming promoters. Id. However, such execution could only occur upon the
unanimous vote of all five members of the board of directors. Id.
41
See id. at 121.
42
See id. at 115-17; see also Jon Kamp, MGM Gets Approval to Build
Massachusetts’ First Resort Casino, WALL STREET J. (June 13, 2014, 12:33 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/mgm-gets-approval-to-build-massachusetts-first-resort
-casino-1402677210.
43
Robert Rizzuto, MGM Once Again Granted New Jersey Gaming License to
Regain Control Over Stake in Atlantic City’s Borgata Hotel Casino,
MASSLIVE.COM (Sept. 11, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://www.masslive.com/politics/
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While MGM still retained its ties with Pansy Ho, the New Jersey Commission
unanimously viewed her reduced interest in the Macau joint venture as having a
minimal impact on MGM’s suitability as a whole.44 While this sudden shift in
the New Jersey Commission’s reasoning may have been influenced by the
Nevada and Massachusetts decisions, some commentators have suggested that
the shift was merely the product of market conditions as opposed to a broader
suitability scheme.45
B. The Caesars Determination
The conflicting MGM suitability determination between New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Maryland, and Nevada is not unique or isolated. Rather,
Massachusetts has also found itself at odds with New Jersey and Nevada
regarding its suitability investigation of Caesars Entertainment.46 In October
2013, a subsidiary of Caesars Entertainment (“Caesars”) was forced to
withdraw from an East Boston casino joint-venture with Suffolk Downs, an
established Massachusetts racetrack, after the Massachusetts Gaming
Commission investigators uncovered a tenuous link to a Russian organized
crime syndicate.47
Specifically, in 2013, Caesars entered into a branding agreement with
Gansevoort Hotel Group (“Gansevoort”), a New York boutique hotel

index.ssf/2014/09/mgm_borgata_casino_atlantic_city.html.
44
See Steven Stradbrooke, Revel Finds Buyer; Trump Entertainment Gets Lifeline;
MGM Welcomed Back, CALVINAYRE (Sept. 11, 2014), http://calvinayre.com/2014/
09/11/casino/revel-finds-buyer-trump-entertainment-lifeline-mgm-reclaim-aclicense/.
45
See Peter Amsel, Trump Plaza Sold for $20m; MGM Okayed to Reapply in AC;
Pinnacle’s Vietnam Writedown, CALVINAYRE (Feb. 15, 2013), http://calvin
ayre.com/2013/02/15/casino/trump-plaza-sold-for-20m-pinnacle-vietnamwritedown/. Under the 2010 settlement with the New Jersey Commission, in
addition to surrendering its license, MGM was also forced to sell its interest in the
existing Borgata Hotel and Casino. See id. However, after searching for a buyer for
over thirty months, MGM was unable to generate interest. See id. While the terms
of the settlement provided extensions until the sale, New Jersey can, at best, be
described as “a dying casino market.” See id.; see also SPECIAL REPORT, supra note
22, at 4. As such, it can be said that New Jersey needs the investment and revenue
streams that a powerhouse like MGM will bring back to the state.
46
See generally Mark Arsenault, Ceasars [sic] Signed Deal with Hotelier Accused
of Having Tie to Russian Mob, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.boston
globe.com/metro/2013/10/23/report-details-concerns-about-caesars/cK6K3OjC5Z
eJ362QygGRvK/story.html.
47
See id. In addition to Caesars’ connection with Russian organized crime,
“[c]ommission investigators also took issue with Caesars’ debt, its treatment of a
high-roller who claimed the company encouraged him to gamble while intoxicated,
and the work history of a Caesars executive who was chief executive of two
companies that came under scrutiny by the Department of Justice for illegal internet
gaming operations while he ran them.” Id.
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company.48 As a part of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission suitability
determination, investigators uncovered a 2012 New York Post article which
alleged that Arik Kislin (“Kislin”), one of the principles of Gansevoort, had ties
to Russian mobsters.49 Even more significantly, investigators uncovered an
internal background check conducted by Caesars which revealed even more
concerns about Kislin.50 A review of Caesars’ internal background check
revealed that Kislin’s uncle was allegedly a member of Russian organized
crime who was involved in ongoing scheme to defraud and embezzle from
Russian banks.51 Further, a company held by Kislin once co-sponsored a
United States travel visa for a known Russian assassin.52 Caesars withdrew
itself from consideration before the Massachusetts Gaming Commission made
a final determination as to its suitability; however, Caesars’ decision to
withdraw only occurred after state investigators indicated they would
recommend an adverse ruling.53 A subsequent report revealed that while Kislin
would in no way benefit from gaming revenues, investigators were still
concerned with Caesars’ association with Kislin, and the fact that Caesars’
Compliance Committee approved the transaction after learning of Kislin’s
nefarious background.54
This recommendation stands in stark contrast to the Massachusetts Gaming
Commission’s previous suitability determination of MGM. As discussed above,
MGM was deemed suitable despite the fact that its joint-venture partner in
Macau had more direct ties to organized crime, had funded a significant portion
of the joint venture with funds directly linked to organized crime, and would
directly benefit from gaming revenues.55
II. CHALLENGING CONFLICTING SUITABILITY DETERMINATIONS
As demonstrated by the conflicting New Jersey and Massachusetts

Id.
See id.; see generally Mitchel Maddux, Hotel Big Caught in ‘NYet,’ N.Y. POST
(Mar. 26, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2012/03/26/hotel-big-caught-in-nyet/.
50
Arsenault, supra note 46.
51
Id. (citing to a Center for Public Integrity Article published in 2000). Sources
also revealed that Kislin’s uncle’s partner in the fraud scheme was Michael
Chernoy, who was the subject of an Interpol worldwide arrest warrant issued by
Spain for money-laundering and organized crime charges. Id.
52
Id.
53
See id.
54
See MASS. GAMING COMM’N, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS
GAMING COMMISSION: STERLING SUFFOLK RACECOURSE, LLC 5, 237 (2013),
http://massgaming.com/wp-content/uploads/SSR-Report-REDACTED.pdf. As discussed above, the Commission was also influenced by: (1) Caesars’ debt load; (2)
its treatment of a high-roller who claimed the company encouraged him to gamble
while intoxicated; and (3) the work history of a Caesars executive implicated in
illegal internet gaming. See Arsenault, supra note 46.
55
See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 3.
48
49
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suitability determinations of MGM and Caesars, a state is not bound and need
not recognize the licensing decisions of other states.56 Instead, states generally
give full and free discretion to their respective gaming commissions to make
licensing and suitability determinations with little to no opportunity for judicial
review.
While many administrative agency decisions are subject to judicial
review,57 most state gaming acts preclude judicial review of gaming
commission determinations under the justification that gaming licenses do not
convey a liberty or property interest, and thus do not trigger Due Process
protections.58 For instance, the Massachusetts Expanded Gaming Act provides
that “[t]he commission shall have full discretion as to whether to issue a
license. Applicants shall have no legal right or privilege to a gaming license
and shall not be entitled to any [judicial] review if denied by the
commission.”59 Instead, after an adverse suitability determination:
[A]n applicant . . . may request a hearing before the
[investigative division of the gaming commission] to
contest the findings. After the hearing, the applicant may
appeal the decision of the [investigative division] to the
commission and the commission may hear the appeal on
the record. The decision of the commission shall be final
and an applicant . . . shall not be entitled to further
review.60
Similarly, the Mississippi Gaming Act expressly provides that “[j]udicial
review is not available for actions, decisions and orders of the commission

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution “requir[es]
states to give appropriate respect to the official acts of other states.” Elizabeth
Redpath, Between Judgment and Law: Full Faith and Credit, Public Policy, and
State Records, 62 Emory L.J. 639, 639 (2013). However, the constitution also “ . . .
leaves each state with the authority to decide who is licensed do what within that
state.” Id. at 673 n. 210 (citing Eugene Volokh, Interstate Recognition of Licenses,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 18, 2007, 2:26 AM), http://volokh.com/posts/
1184739962.shtml).
57
UNIF. LAW COMM’N, MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (1981) provides:
Except to the extent that this Act or another statute provides . . . the court shall
grant relief only if it determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been
substantially prejudiced by any one or more the following . . . [t]he agency action is
based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court . . . [or] [otherwise, unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious].
Id. at § 5-116.
58
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-264 (1970) (determining triggers
for Due Process); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. V. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
59
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 23K, § 17(g) (West 2017).
60
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 23K, § 30(g) (West 2017).
56
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relating to the denial of a license or to limited or conditional licenses.”61 As
such, subject to a few, well-delineated carve-backs (primarily for the actions
outside of the commissions’ statutory authority), gaming license applicants are
statutorily precluded from challenging conflicting state suitability
determinations.
III. IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE LACK OF REDRESSABILITY
Coupled with the lack of meaningful judicial review, the uncertainty of
state-specific suitability determinations makes licensing applications a gamble.
While all professional licensing determinations carry a certain level of
uncertainty (i.e. character and fitness determinations for lawyers), gaming
licenses are unique in the sheer expense associated with the application process.
For instance, the State of New York requires casino applicants to pay a $1
million application fee to the state’s gaming commission “to defray the costs
associated with the processing of the [a]pplication, the investigation of the
[a]pplicant and related matters.”62 Similarly, Massachusetts requires a $400,000
application fee — in addition to an $85 million licensing fee if approved.63
While these application fees are designed to be prohibitively expensive to
poorly capitalized companies, and are relatively de minimus to large operators
such as MGM (which posts billions of dollars in net revenues annually), they
do not account for the applicant’s own due diligence expenses in preparing the
application, or internal structuring or restructuring expenses associated with
garnering a favorable suitability determination.64 As such, expenses associated
with suitability determinations can far exceed the initial application fee, making
the lack of state-by-state consistency or judicial oversight especially
problematic to would-be applicants.65
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-127(2) (West x2017).
N.Y. GAMING COMM’N, REQUEST FOR APPLICATIONS TO DEVELOP AND OPERATE
A GAMING FACILITY IN NEW YORK STATE, 30 (2015), http://gaming.ny.gov/
pdf/03.23.15.RFA.PDF.
63
Casino/Slots Parlor Development, MASS. GAMING COMM’N, https://web.archive.
org/web/20140715001509/https://massgaming.com/about/casinoslots-parlordevelopment/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
64
See generally Bradley Seth McNew, 3 Reasons MGM Resorts International
Stock Could Rise, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 1, 2015, 11:32 AM), https://www.fool.com/
investing/general/2015/01/01/3-reasons-mgm-resorts-international-stock-couldri.aspx?source=isesitlnk0000001&mrr=1.00.
65
Nearly a decade ago, the International Association of Gaming Advisors, along
with the International Association of Gaming Regulators, introduced the “MultiJurisdictional Personal History Disclosure Form,” a model application for key
licensees (individuals in responsible positions). DAVID O. STEWART, IMPROVING
GAMING REGULATIONS: 10 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STREAMLINING PROCESSES
WHILE MAINTAINING INTEGRITY 3 (2011), https://www.americangaming.org/
sites/default/files/research_files/reg_reform_white_paper_final.pdf. While this
form has been widely adopted, many states — Illinois, Colorado, Indiana,
Missouri, and Michigan – still retain state-specific forms. Id. Further, even though
61
62
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Based on this expense and lack of certainty, the gaming industry’s primary
lobbying organization, the American Gaming Association (“AGA”), has
advocated that the states voluntarily adopt a system of reciprocity in which a
state will grant a license to an applicant when the applicant is already licensed
in a different jurisdiction, and in so doing, “avoid[] duplicative background
investigations for individuals and entities already . . . approved by reputable
authorities.”66 While the reciprocity system proposed by the AGA has merit,
the organization has overlooked a seemingly more viable solution — federal
regulation.
IV. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL REGULATION67
As noted above, Congress is vested with the ability to regulate interstate
commerce and may otherwise restrict “permissible state regulation” —
including licensing requirements — subject to some limitations.68 Both
Congress and the judiciary have recognized that “gambling involves the use,
and has an effect upon, interstate commerce,” and is permissibly subject to
federal regulation.69 In fact, Congress has already used this authority to regulate
gaming in between and among the several states, including the prohibition of
unauthorized transportation of lottery tickets between states,70 outlawing sports
betting under the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992
(“PASPA”),71 and regulating gaming on Native American lands.72 As such,
Congress has the legal ability to enact regulatory reforms.

the industry recognizes that a uniform application form is needed for business
entities licensed in multiple jurisdictions, no such form exists — further leading to
discrepancies in state-by-state suitability determinations. See id. at 4.
66
Id. at 4.
67
The author recognizes that such a proposal necessarily implicates a profusion of
issues, including but not limited to: funding (most likely in the form of the
application fee), on-going reviews of suitability, etc.; however, the purpose of this
paper is to begin a dialogue about the possibility of sweeping federal reforms that
have not otherwise been contemplated by the industry. See infra Conclusion.
68
Gulch Gaming, Inc. v. South Dakota, 781 F. Supp. 621, 624 (D.S.D. 1991); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
69
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208,
225 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir.
1972)).
70
18 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).
71
28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).
72
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2012). See Gambling Law: An Overview, LEGAL INFO.
INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/gambling (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). Even
though Congress has exercised the power to regulate gaming in some instances, it
has consistently declined to bring all gaming activity under federal control. See
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 53 (1970) (“The intent of [the Organized Crime Control
Act] . . . is not to bring all illegal gambling activity within the control of the Federal
Government, but to deal only with illegal gambling activities of major
proportions.”).
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Due to the realities and effect of inconsistent suitability determinations
under the current state-by-state licensing approach, Congress should enact a
nationwide suitability scheme while retaining the ability of the states to
otherwise regulate gaming within their borders pursuant to their police power.73
Under this scheme, prospective casino applicants would apply for a federal
suitability determination in a manner similar to the state-level applications
detailed above. After the appropriate investigation and hearings, federal
regulators would then make a suitability determination. Based on this
determination, the applicant could apply for licensure in states that allow
gaming, subject to each state’s respective regulations and licensing
requirements unrelated to the suitability determination. While such a scheme
would still be free from judicial review, a single suitability determination
would eliminate conflicting state decisions and likely bring greater confidence
to the industry.
CONCLUSION
While the proposal contained here is high-level and merely designed to
facilitate a discussion in the gaming industry about federal level regulations
regarding suitability as an alternative to voluntary state reciprocity agreements
advocated by the AGA, it is clear that state-by-state suitability determination
must be relegated to the past. The gaming industry continues to grow, both in
terms of revenue and the number of states which permit gaming. As such, state
state-by-state suitability determinations are not only a waste of resources and
unnecessarily duplicative, but also result in inconsistent determinations about
the suitability of a single casino applicant or similarly situated applicants. There
is no question that gaming heavily impacts interstate commerce and the current
system is untenable — therefore Congress must act.

While such a regulatory scheme would necessarily call into question the proper
role of federalism, states and federal regulators already engage in a joint-licensing
determinations in the context of Indian Gaming. Specifically, under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), Congress permits Native American to offer
casino-style gaming (Class III) only when: (1) the tribe enters into a compact with a
state that allows tribal gaming; and (2) a federal agency, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, approves the compact. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (establishing
dual state and federal requirements for Indian gaming). While this interplay
between the states and the federal government was largely the by-product of the
federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction over Indian affairs, it may serve as a
basic framework for the federalized suitability determination proposed here.
Although ancillary to this discussion, it is also worth noting Congress requires that
before the Native American tribe may enter into a compact with the state, they
must: (1) possess tribal land to which they are able to prove a historic and
continuous connection; and (2) this land must be placed into a trust established for
gaming purposes. See id.
73

